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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AS JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Guy-Uriel E. Charles*& Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer**
In Gill v. Whitford,1 the Supreme Court turned aside the most promising vehicle for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims since the
Court first fully addressed the issue more than thirty years ago in Davis
v. Bandemer.2 Though the Court has long been deeply divided on the
constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering, especially on the threshold
question of justiciability, Justice Kennedy, the decisive fifth vote and the
Court's then-resident super median, 3 previously signaled, explicitly and
strongly, his willingness to adjudicate these claims if putative plaintiffs
would present him with judicially manageable standards. 4 The plaintiffs in Gill took up that challenge.
The Gill plaintiffs filed suit against a redistricting plan from the
State of Wisconsin that, by almost all measures, constituted a successful
attempt by the Republican Party to minimize the ability of Democrats
to translate their electoral votes into legislative seats.5 The plaintiffs,
armed with a new test - the efficiency gap 6 - prevailed in the lower
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1 '38 S. Ct. igi6 (2018).
2 478 U.S. I09 (I986).
3 Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 6i STAN. L. REV. 37, 41 (2008).
4 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 54' U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).

Justice Kennedy described the necessity of a workable standard for measuring the burden of gerrymandering on representational rights for justiciability. Id. at 307-08.
5 See Gill, i38 S. Ct. at 1923-24.
6 The "efficiency gap" is a measure of partisan symmetry. "The efficiency gap assumes that the
strategy of the dominant party, the party in control of the districting, is to group its voters as efficiently as possible and to group the voters of the out party as inefficiently as possible." JAMES A.
GARDNER & GUY-URIEL CHARLES, ELECTION LAW IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

309 (2d ed. 2oi8). The efficiency gap was introduced by a political scientist, Eric McGhee, see Eric
McGhee, MeasuringPartisanBias in Single-Member DistrictElectoral Systems, 39 LEGIS. STUD.
Q. 55, 68 (2014), and extended into law by McGhee and Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos, see
Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, PartisanGerrymanderingand the Efficiency Gap,
82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 834 (2015); see also Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Essay,
The Measure of a Metric: The Debate over Quantifying PartisanGerrymandering,70 STAN. L. REV.
1503, 1505-o6 (2018).
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court.7 Moreover, the issue of partisan gerrymandering appeared to
have finally galvanized broad popular opposition.8
Gill looked like the perfect opportunity for the Court to address the
political gerrymandering question once and for all. As further evidence
of what seemed to be the Court's intention to strike down egregious
political gerrymanders, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a political
gerrymandering case from Maryland, Benisek v. Lamone. 9 The Court
also had a third case pending from North Carolina, Rucho v. Common
Cause,10 in which a three-judge court concluded that North Carolina's
2016 redistricting plan, to which plaintiffs raised statewide and districtby-district gerrymandering challenges, was a partisan gerrymander in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and the
Elections Clause. 1 The Maryland case was particularly noteworthy because the plaintiffs challenged a district gerrymandered by the Maryland
Democratic Party.1 2 Taken together, Gill and Benisek presented the
Court with gerrymandering claims by both major political parties and
would have provided cover from cries of partisan favoritism. The cases
also presented the Court with two gerrymandering claims of different
scale. The Gill plaintiffs focused on how their state's plan affected political power throughout the state,1 3 and the Benisek plaintiffs focused
on how the composition of a particular district affected their right
to vote. 1 4 In addition, the two cases presented the Court with two different constitutional theories of the problem, one based upon the Equal
Protection Clause and First Amendment associational rights 15 and the
other focused on a First Amendment retaliation claim.1 6 Between them,
Gill and Benisek provided the Court a range of options for a narrow or
broad intervention. And if the Court wanted to strengthen its justifications for intervention and further expand its options, it had an ace in
the hole with Rucho, which combined all of the issues presented in Gill
and Benisek in a single case. 7 It seemed plausible and even ineluctable
that the Court was about to subject the increasingly despised partisan
gerrymander to meaningful judicial review.
7 See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3 d 837, 843, 854-55 (W.D. Wis. 2oi6).
8 Supermajority of Americans Want Supreme Court to Limit Partisan Gerrymandering,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Sept. ii, 2017), https:Hcampaignlegal.org/press-releases/supermajorityamericans-want-supreme-court-limit-partisan-gerrymandering [https:Hperma.cc/M5XQ-2XW2].
9 '38 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) (per curiam).
10 I38 S. Ct. 2679 (2018) (mem.).
11 Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d587,597-98,6o8- og(M.D.N.C. 2018); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § i; id. amend. I; id. art. I, § 4.
12 Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3 d 799, 8og-io (D. Md. 2017).
13 Gill, I38 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
14 Benisek, I38 S. Ct. at 1943.
15 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1924.
16 Benisek, 266 F. Supp. 3 d at 8oi.
17 Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 . Supp. 3 d 587, 597 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
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To the surprise of many, the Court did not rule on the constitutionality of political gerrymandering claims. The Court anticlimactically
resolved Gill on standing grounds. Writing for a unanimous Court, 8
Chief Justice Roberts explained that according to the plaintiffs' theory
of their constitutional injury - that they were "placed in legislative districts deliberately designed to 'waste' their votes in elections where their
chosen candidates will win in landslides (packing) or are destined to lose
by closer margins (cracking)" - they must allege and prove their constitutional injury at the district level. 19 The Court remanded the case
to allow plaintiffs to show standing. 20 The Court's decision in Benisek
was even more prosaic. The Court simply affirmed the lower court's
decision to deny the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction. 21 Furthermore,
in Rucho, the Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded
the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Gill.2 2 Bubbles
burst.
As if the Court's decisions in Gill, Benisek, and Rucho were not
enough to cast a pall on the festive parade expected to accompany the
resolution of the cases, Justice Kennedy announced his retirement from
the Court at the end of the Term. Justice Kennedy's departure, and the
unlikely prospect that his replacement will join the Court's liberal bloc
on this issue, seem to signal the end of the road for political gerrymandering claims for the foreseeable future.
To us, however, it is too premature to write off judicial supervision
of political gerrymandering claims. There are clearly some Justices who
do not believe that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, particularly Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. 23 There are also clearly some
Justices who believe that these cases are justiciable, particularly Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 24 As importantly, there is no
doubt that Chief Justice Roberts is not yet convinced that the Court
bears an institutional responsibility to address the problem of partisan
gerrymandering. Indeed, he seemed disdainful of the proposition, which
he attributed to the plaintiffs, that "[t]he Court should exercise its power
here because it is the 'only institution in the United States' capable of

18 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined all but the last part of Chief Justice Roberts's opinion,

which remanded the case and gave the plaintiffs another opportunity on remand to demonstrate
standing. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1933-34. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch would have dismissed the
plaintiffs' claims. See id.at 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1930 (majority opinion) ("To the extent the plaintiffs' alleged harm is the
dilution of their votes, that injury is district specific.").
20 Id. at 1934.

21 Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1945 (2018) (per curiam).
22 Rucho v. Common Cause, 138 S. Ct. 2679 (2o18) (mem.) (vacating and remanding to district
court).
23 See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
24 See id. at 1945 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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'solv[ing] this problem.' ' 25 We presume that this is one of the reasons
why Justice Kagan spent part of her concurring opinion in Gill articulating the harms caused by partisan gerrymandering and making the
26
case in favor of judicial intervention.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts's, and perhaps
Justice Alito's, skepticism about the utility of judicial supervision of partisan gerrymandering claims, it is also significant that they did not vote
in Gill to hold partisan gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable. Rather
than dismiss the case, as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch urged, they
joined the liberal Justices and agreed to send the litigants back to the
lower court to resolve the standing issues. 27 The fact that the Court
decided the case on standing grounds and provided political gerrymandering plaintiffs another opportunity to make their case is indicative
that some of the Justices who are skeptical of judicial supervision are
nevertheless worried, and rightly so, about the implications of nonintervention. They are not yet persuaded that there is a problem to which
the Court ought to provide a solution; but they also have an intuition
that nonintervention is a significant abdication of judicial responsibility.
They need more time to further contemplate a justification for engagement on what they clearly view as a consequential decision. Deciding
Gill on standing grounds and remanding the case is a holding-pattern
maneuver.
We join a growing consensus among an impressive group of election
law scholars who argue that partisanship is a problem in districting and
that the Court is authorized by the Constitution to intervene. 28 We advance two novel claims. First, in Part I, we provide a comprehensive

25 Id. at 1929 (majority opinion) (second alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Gill, 138 S. Ct. i916 (No. i6-ii6i), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/
argument-transcripts/2017/i 6-i -i6i-mjno.pdf [https:Hperma.cc/JBL 5 -TRVA]).
26 See id. at 1940-41 (Kagan, J., concurring). The dialogue seems to have taken a step backward. Instead of arguing about whether political gerrymandering claims are best adjudicated under
the First or Fourteenth Amendments, or whether the efficiency gap adequately captures the harm
of political gerrymandering, we are debating whether political gerrymandering claims cause constitutional harms at all and whether those harms are sufficient to compel the Court to intervene.
27 See id. at 1934 (majority opinion); id. at 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
28 See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, From Educational Adequacy to Representational Adequacy: A New Template for Legal Attacks on Partisan Gerrymanders, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
i6oi, -6o5-7 (2018); Michael S. Kang, Gerrymanderingand the ConstitutionalNorm Against Government Partisanship,ii6 MICH. L. REV. 35', 353-56 (2017); Justin Levitt, Intent Is Enough: Invidious Partisanshipin Redistricting,59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1993, 2024-31 (2018) [hereinafter
Levitt, Intent Is Enough]; Justin Levitt, The PartisanshipSpectrum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1787,
-8i-6- -9 (2014); Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering,59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 21 -8-20 (2oI8); Daniel P Tokaji, Gerrymanderingand Association, 59

WM. & MARY L. REV. 2159, 2162-64 (2oi8). There are some important dissenting voices. For one

of the most creative and compelling, see Franita Tolson, Benign Partisanship,88

NOTRE DAME
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account of the Court's skepticism of judicial supervision of democratic
politics, an account that we call the narrative of nonintervention. We
situate Gill v. Whitford and the Court's recent political gerrymandering
cases within this narrative and argue that the debate over standing, jurisdiction, and judicially manageable standards is a red herring. The
Court has previously offered the same set of objections in analogous
contexts: specifically, when it refused to intervene to protect African
Americans against widespread racial discrimination in the political process 29 and when it refused to intervene to address the problem of grossly
malapportioned districts. 3 0 Neither standing doctrine, nor the absence
or presence of judicially manageable standards, nor jurisdiction determined judicial intervention in those prior moments. Rather, the Court's
reluctance to intervene was a function of the Court's institutional calculus that it ought to protect its stature and institutional capital when it
engages in what look like political fights. The lesson of Part I is that
the Court's refusal to intervene to address the problems of racial disenfranchisement and malapportionment - its narrative of nonintervention in those contexts - yielded to the current conditions of governance.
In both the race and malapportionment contexts, the Court overcame
its initial skepticism and responded to the needs of the time.
In Part II, we argue that the Court's posture of nonintervention in
the political gerrymandering cases should yield as a consequence of the
political reality of our moment, a political environment characterized by
extreme partisan polarization. Though the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims is often supported by strong normative claims, we
argue, on utilitarian grounds, that the Court ought to occasionally make
strategic interventions in the domain of law and politics, such as limiting
partisan gerrymandering, where doing so is reasonably likely to avoid
future problems that would lead to greater interventions. Thus, the
Court ought to articulate a principle against partisanship in the construction of electoral structures because curbing partisan gerrymandering would have the benefit of curtailing a lot of other kinds of manipulations in the electoral system that are driven by the same type of
partisan impulse that motivates partisan gerrymandering claims. The
other kinds of manipulations we have in mind include voter identification rules, voter registration rules, voter purge practices, racial gerrymandering, election administration practices, disputes about the location of polling places, and the like. For ease of exposition, we refer to

L. REV. 395, 397-99

(2012);

and Franita Tolson, PartisanGerrymanderingas a Safeguard of Feder-

alism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859, 888-9o.

29 See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486-88 (1903).
30 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
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these types of claims as secondary claims or secondary disputes. 3 1 Ironically, and contra the narrative of nonintervention, judicial intervention
in this context is an act of judicial restraint because it obviates the need
for the Court to take sides later on substantive partisan disputes that
would arguably arise as a result of unconstrained state actors' partisan
manipulation of electoral rules. Counterintuitively, this argument advances a utilitarian or instrumental conception of judicial restraint. The
Court can do a little now - rein in partisan gerrymandering - so it
can do a lot less later - by deterring some forms of bad behavior it
would otherwise have to deal with on the merits.
I.

GILL v WHITFORD AND THE NARRATIVE OF
NONINTERVENTION

Gill v. Whitford is nominally a case about standing. Gill is best understood within a line of cases in which the Court articulated its reluctance to police the political process and its justifications for its posture
of nonintervention. We call this articulation the narrative of nonintervention. Gill thus reflects two sentiments in tension with one another.
On the one hand, rooted within the narrative of nonintervention, the
Court is skeptical that judicial review of partisan gerrymandering claims
is necessary. On the other hand, the Court seems to intuit that judicial
abdication would be problematic and is trying to come to terms with
the implications of nonintervention for the democratic process and for
the Court as an institution.3 2 The Court is ambivalent about the proper
course, and Gill is a prudential reflection of this ambivalence. Section
A explains the contours of the narrative of nonintervention. Section B
turns to Gill and explains the Court's standing analysis as a function of
its ambivalence, the pull of the narrative of nonintervention, and the
fear of nonintervention's potential toll on the democratic process. Section C critiques the narrative of nonintervention as devoid of analytic
content. The point of the narrative is simply that the Court is concerned
about its stature and its political capital.

A. The Narrative
There is a story that the Court tells when it does not want to supervise the ground rules of democratic politics. It goes something like this:
The Court cannot intervene in political cases because to do so would be
to insert itself unjustifiably in political and policy decisions that are
31 Justice Kagan astutely noted her concerns with the secondary effects of partisan gerrymandering in Gill. As she stated, "the evils of gerrymandering seep into the legislative process itself,"

which makes it harder for political actors to "negotiat[e] and compromise" and to "reach[] pragmatic,
bipartisan solutions to the nation's problems."

Gill, '38 S. Ct. at 1940 (Kagan, J., concurring).

Among the "evils of gerrymandering" is the desire to manipulate electoral rules, not just electoral
districts, to maintain political power at all costs.
32 See id.at 1931 (majority opinion).
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reserved for the democratic process and not for judges. It cannot intervene because the Constitution protects only individual rights and does
not permit judges to concern themselves with the distribution of power
among groups or with the design of democratic institutions. Though it
can intervene on behalf of racial minorities, it cannot intervene to protect political parties. It cannot intervene where it does not have an ex
ante rule that cabins its discretion. The Court told us this story, in a
slightly modified version, when it was asked to protect rights of political
participation against racial discrimination; when it was asked to address
malapportionment; and when it was asked to address partisan gerrymandering. The Court's core concern is not about individual rights,
race, or rules, but that it is corrosive of the Court's institutional capital
and legitimacy if the Court engages in the political process by supervising the ground rules of democratic politics. This is the narrative of
nonintervention.
The narrative has taken so strong a hold in the legal imagination
that it is hard to remember a world without it. We can trace its roots to
Justice Holmes in the anticanonical Giles v. Harris.33 In Giles, a black
voter from Alabama, Jackson W. Giles, sued county election officials for
denying him and other black voters the right to register and to vote, in
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.3 4 At the beginning of the twentieth century, Alabama amended its constitution as part
of a statewide scheme to deprive African Americans of the right to vote
and effectively to nullify the Reconstruction Amendments. 35 The disenfranchisement was effectuated through the application of voting restrictions that were discriminatorily applied so that they would have
minimal impact on white voters and maximum impact on the state's
African American population, as well as through grandfather clauses
that would have the effect of exempting whites but not African Americans
36
from certain requirements.
The Court dismissed Mr. Giles's claims on jurisdictional grounds.
Justice Holmes argued that the Court did not have the power to provide
the equitable relief requested by the plaintiff, stating that "equity cannot undertake ... to enforce political rights. '37 According to Justice
Holmes, the plaintiffs alleged "that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks from voting. '38 If so, Justice Holmes
33 189 U.S. 475. For the first and most thorough examination of Giles, see Richard H. Pildes,
Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000). Professor Pildes
argues that Giles should be restored from obscurity and ought to be central to the constitutional
law and race-and-law fields. Id. at 317-19.
34 Giles, -89 U.S. at 482.
35 See Pildes, supra note 33, at 301-04.
36 See id. at 302-03.
37 Giles, 189 U.S. at 487.
38 Id. at 488.
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concluded, "relief from a great political wrong.., by the people of a
State and the State itself[] must be given by them or by the legislative
39
and political department of the government of the United States.
The Court explicitly voiced its unwillingness to find jurisdiction in
1946, in the better-known case of Colegrove v. Green.40 In Colegrove,
Justice Frankfurter famously concluded that the Court did not have ju41
risdiction to address Illinois's malapportioned congressional districts.
Justice Frankfurter approached the issue with his characteristic bluntness. He stated that malapportionment claims did not implicate indi42
vidual rights, such as the denial of the franchise on the basis of race.
Rather, the Court, citing Giles, stated that the case was an attempt to
vindicate "a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity. '43 Consequently, the
44
case could not be resolved "by verbal fencing about 'jurisdiction.'
These disputes are about "politics, in the sense of party contests and
party interests. 4 5 As such, the Court should stay away because "[iut is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of
the people. '46 He concluded that "[tihe Constitution has left the performance of many duties in our governmental scheme to depend on the
fidelity of the executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the
vigilance of the people in exercising their political rights. '47 Justice
Frankfurter's message was clear and direct: in order to preserve the
Court's stature and legitimacy as a legal institution, the Court "ought
4
not to enter this political thicket."
The Court overcame this ambivalence in Baker v. Carr4 9 with a mere
turn to the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs in Baker argued
that Tennessee's malapportioned state legislative districts were justiciable under the Fourteenth Amendment,5 0 and in an opinion by Justice
51 l
and over a vociferous dissent by Justice Frankfurter
Brennan-

39 Id.

U.S. 549 (1946).
Id. at 552.
See id.

40 328
41
42

43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 554; see also id. at 553 ("Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters

that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the determination
of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof.").
46 Id. at 553-54.
47 Id. at 5 56.
48

Id.

49 369 U.S. 1-86 (i-962).
50 Id. at -87-88.
51 See id. at 266-67 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court today reverses a uniform course of

decision established by a dozen cases, including one by which the very claim now sustained was
unanimously rejected only five years ago.").

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132:236

the Court agreed. 52 But Baker did not fully expiate the Court's ambivalence, nor did Baker indicate how far the Court would go in policing
the ground rules of democratic politics.
Gaffney v. Cummings, 53 a 1973 challenge to a Connecticut bipartisan
gerrymander, 54 is an apt example. The Court in Gaffney seemed bemused by the claim that the redistricting plan in question violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it "was drawn with the conscious intent to ... achieve a rough approximation of the statewide political
strengths of the Democratic and Republican Parties. '55 The majority
explained that "[i]t would be idle ... to contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is
sufficient to invalidate it. ' ' 56 The Court was not skeptical of the plaintiffs' claim because political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable 51 -' the preoccupation with the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims was a later development. The Court was skeptical
because the plaintiffs' claim amounted to a complaint that the plaintiffs
had been assigned to electoral districts simply to produce an intended
political outcome. 58 The Court could not imagine a situation where
partisan politics would be removed from the design of electoral districts. 59 To have sustained their complaint, plaintiffs would have needed
to show not simply that the political process had produced a political
outcome, but that the line-drawers had minimized or canceled out their
political strength by creating districts with large variations in population. 6 0 Because the Connecticut redistricting plan provided plaintiffs
with roughly proportional representation, the plaintiffs could not make
61
such a showing.
Thirteen years later, when the Court next addressed a partisan gerrymander in Davis v. Bandemer, the Justices seemed less bemused
and more frustrated. In Bandemer, plaintiffs challenged Indiana's apportionment plan on partisan gerrymandering grounds, arguing that
their voters were diluted by Republican partisans in charge of the redistricting process. 62 Importantly, a majority agreed that the claim was

52
53
54
55
56
57

See id. at 237 (majority opinion).
412 U.S. 735 (1973).
See id. at 736-40.
Id. at 752.
Id.
See id. at 754 ("What is done in so arranging for elections, or to achieve political ends or
allocate political power, is not wholly exempt from judicial scrutiny ... .
58 See id. at 751-52.
59 See id. at 753 ("Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.").
60 Id. at 743-44 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 577-79 (1964)).
61 See id. at 750-51.
62 478 U.S. 109, 115 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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justiciable. 63 But the Court could not agree on much more. Writing for
a plurality, Justice White concluded that the plaintiffs could not show
that they had been subjected to unconstitutional treatment. 64 To have
proven a constitutional violation, Justice White argued, the plaintiffs
would have needed to show both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect. 65 Justice White thought that, in general, a showing of discriminatory intent "should not be very difficult to prove. '66 The question for the Justices - a question that remains to this day - was about
proving unconstitutional discriminatory effect. According to the plurality, discriminatory effect "occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group
of voters' influence on the political process as a whole. '67 The plaintiffs
in Bandemer could not prevail because they could not show that their
6
influence was consistently degraded. s
The conclusion that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable
69
provoked a very sharp and influential response by Justice O'Connor.
Her argument against justiciability relied upon a series of dichotomous
principles,7 0 which have set the terms for the debate over judicial supervision of democratic politics and have also served as a rough guide indicating when judicial supervision of democratic politics is warranted.
These principles largely mirrored the concerns of Justice Frankfurter,
the chief advocate of judicial abstention and Justice O'Connor's intellectual forebear, who made the case successfully against supervision in

Colegrove v. Green but famously lost in Baker v. Carr.
Bandemer evidenced and presaged what would become a fundamental and long-lasting divide on the Court with respect to two essential
questions: whether political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, and
if so, what the nature of the constitutional harm might be. That divide
was on full display eighteen years later when Justice Scalia rehearsed
Justice O'Connor's four dichotomous principles from Bandemer with
71
almost perfect pitch in his plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer.
63

Id. at

125

(majority opinion).

64 Id. at 143 (plurality opinion).
65 Id. at 127.
66 Id. at 129. Justice White thought proving discriminatory intent ought to be easy because
"[t]he reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences." Id. (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753). Also quoting Gaffney, Justice White repeated:
"Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment." Id. at
128 (quoting Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753).
67 Id. at 132.
68 Id.

at 134-37.

Id. at 144 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
70 See infra Pp. 246-50.
71 541 U.S. 267 (2004). Justice Scalia authored the opinion that announced the judgment of the
Court but the reasoning of a plurality of Justices. Four Justices - Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas - concluded that political gerrymandering claims were
69
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. Law and Politics. - The first set of dichotomous principles is the
law-politics tension. Justice O'Connor argued in Bandemer that political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable because they were inherently about partisan politics, not law.7 2 In her view, "the legislative
business of apportionment is fundamentally a political affair, and challenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out by the very parties that are responsible for this process - present a
political question in the truest sense. '7 3 Like the Court in Gaffney, she
could not imagine that redistricting could be nonpartisan or apolitical.
As Justice O'Connor noted: "The opportunity to control the drawing of
electoral boundaries through the legislative process of apportionment is
a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States . . . . ">4 She
contended that fundamental choices about governance belong to the political process and not to the courts.' 5 One can hear echoes of Justice
Frankfurter in Colegrove, where he stated emphatically that "[i]t is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the
people. 7 6 Like Justice Frankfurter, Justice O'Connor worried that "[tlo
turn these matters over to the federal judiciary is to inject the courts
into the most heated partisan issues."77
Justice Scalia picked up the same law-politics refrain in Vieth. He
began his analysis by quoting Chief Justice Marshall's famous proposition in Marbury v. Madison - "[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is"' 8 - but his
main point is Frankfurterian. Shadowing Justice Frankfurter, Justice
Scalia wrote that "[slometimes ... the law is that the judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness - because
the question is entrusted to one of the political branches or involves no
judicially enforceable rights."7 9 Or as Justice Frankfurter put it: "The
nonjusticiable. Id. at 305-o6. And four Justices concluded that political gerrymandering claims
were justiciable; that group consisted of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. See id. at
317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. Even though he agreed that the plaintiffs' claim ought
to be dismissed, he would not foreclose the possibility that the Court might eventually develop
judicially manageable standards. Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Consequently, he was not prepared to conclude that political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable.
See id. at 316-17.
72 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
73 Id. at 145.
74 Id.
75 Id. ("I do not believe, and the Court offers not a shred of evidence to suggest, that the Framers
of the Constitution intended the judicial power to encompass the making of such fundamental
choices about how this Nation is to be governed.").
76 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) (plurality opinion).
77 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
78 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 (2004) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
79 Id.
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Constitution has many commands that are not enforceable by courts
because they clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that
circumscribe judicial action."8' 0 Redistricting belongs to the political
process, and a political process naturally produces political outcomes8 1
2. Individual Rights and Structure. - The second set of dichotomous principles is the individual rights-structural rights divide. Noninterventionists have generally argued that the only proper purpose of
judicial review of democratic politics is to vindicate violations of individual rights.8 2 Correspondingly, noninterventionists have also argued
that judicial review should not be deployed to guard against the maldistribution of political power among groups or to direct the manner in
which political power is exercised through the institutions that structure
and shape democratic politics.8 3 This belief results from the fact that
the maldistribution of political power or the institutional arrangements
of democratic politics reflects structural rights, which are not protected
by the Constitution.
Justice O'Connor sided with the noninterventionists and argued that
in the domain of law and democracy, the Constitution is concerned only
with individual rights violations.8 4 In her view, the Framers did not
carve out a role for courts to adjudicate structural rights.8 5 Accordingly,
political gerrymandering claims are not cognizable under the Constitution
because political gerrymandering claims do not vindicate individual
rights, but rather, they call into question the distribution of power
among groups and the institutional arrangements that channel political
power in the polity.8 6 Consequently, courts do not have a legal basis for
arbitrating political power among groups or for restructuring political
institutions.8 7 Aware of the weight of reapportionment cases, Justice

80 Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
81 For powerful and persuasive rebuttals to the view that partisanship is a necessary condition

of the redistricting process, see Kang, supra note 28, at 366-75; Levitt, Intent is Enough, supra note
28, at 2024-31.
82 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. -86, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting that
malapportionment claims are "a wholly different matter from denial of the franchise to individuals
because of race, color, religion or sex"); see generally RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT
AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V CARR TO BUSH V GORE Io, 79-

Ioo (2003).
83 See, e.g., Baker,369 U.S. at 284-85 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court has been partic-

ularly unwilling to intervene in matters concerning the structure and organization of the political
institutions of the States." Id. at 284.).
84 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. lo9, 147-52 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
85 Id. at 147 (noting that group rights do not present a harm that the Constitution recognizes
because "no group right to an equal share of political power was ever intended by the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment").
86 Id. at 149 ("The rights asserted in this case are group rights to an equal share of political
power and representation ....
");
id. at -55.
87 Id. at -55.
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O'Connor argued that those cases were inapposite in the political gerrymandering context because the "right asserted [in those cases] was an
individual right to a vote whose weight was not arbitrarily subjected to
'debasement. "'88
This rights-structure distinction also arose in Vieth. The plaintiffs
in Vieth argued the state violates the Constitution by drawing district
lines "with a predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage."8' 9 The
plaintiffs additionally accepted that political gerrymandering claims require discriminatory effect, which they argued is met when district lines
crack and pack voters because of the voters' political identity and where
the totality of circumstances shows that the voters are less able to translate their votes into legislative seats. 90 Justice Scalia took issue with the
plaintiffs' effects standard on the ground that it "rests upon the principle
that groups ... have a right to proportional representation.' ' 91 This is
not a constitutional principle, he argued, because the Constitution "guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation
in government to equivalently sized groups. It nowhere says that farmers or urban dwellers, Christian fundamentalists or Jews, Republicans
or Democrats, must be accorded political strength proportionate to their
numbers.

92

3. Race and Politics. - The third dichotomy is between race and
politics. The animating idea of the race-politics dichotomy is that race
is simply different (or maybe an exception). Within the parameters of
this dichotomy, claims that allege racial discrimination in the political
process are justiciable, but claims that allege political or partisan discrimination are not. A central question is whether racial identity and
partisan identity are sufficiently similar such that the Constitution
should treat racial and partisan gerrymanders symmetrically.
In
Bandemer, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Court's precedents on
racial vote dilution and racial gerrymandering do not authorize the
Court to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims. 93 Justice O'Connor
offered three reasons to distinguish claims by racial groups from claims
by parties.
First, by citing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker, Justice
O'Connor argued that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were
promulgated specifically to address the problem of racial discrimination
and, with respect to the Fifteenth Amendment, specifically the problem
88 Id. at 149 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 194).

89 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 284 (2004) (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Brief for Appellants at 19, Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (No. 02-158o) (emphasis added)).
90 Id. at 286-87.
91 Id. at 288.
92

Id.

93 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at I51-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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of racial discrimination in voting. 94 Consequently, they provide a textual directive to courts and a justification for courts to supervise the use
of race in the design of electoral districts. 95 Justice Scalia similarly argued in Vieth that "[a] purpose to discriminate on the basis of race receives the strictest scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, while a
similar purpose to discriminate on the basis of politics does not. '96 Additionally, "our country's long and persistent history of racial discrimination in voting - as well as our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which always has reserved the strictest scrutiny for
discrimination on the basis of race -" supports the supposition that
racial gerrymanders are subject to a higher level of scrutiny than political ones. 97
Second, Justice O'Connor explained that racial groups are different
from parties because racial minorities "are a discrete and insular group
vulnerable to exclusion from the political process by some dominant
group."98s Unlike racial groups, the major "political parties are the dominant groups," able to protect themselves in the political process. 99
Moreover, race is an immutable characteristic, whereas partisan identity
is not. l00
Third, Justice O'Connor maintained that protecting political parties
from the diminution of their political power would ultimately evolve
into a right of proportional political representation, a right not found in
the Constitution. 10 1 Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that racial
identity and partisan identity are not comparable identity categories for
constitutional purposes. 10 2 The Court has a constitutional reason for
guaranteeing the political equality of racial groups that it does not have
for political groups.
4. Rules and Standards. - Finally, the fourth tension is best articulated as a rules-standards distinction. The language the Court uses,
"judicially manageable standards, ' 10 3 seems to focus the inquiry on the
existence of "standards" as opposed to "rules" to adjudicate political gerrymandering claims. But the language of "judicially manageable standards" is a term of art. 10 4 The Court's jurisprudence reveals a search for

Id. at ii.
Id. at I51-52.
541 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion).
97 Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (I993)).
98 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
94
95
96

99 Id.
100 Id. at i56.
101 Id. at i56-58.
102

Id. at i6o-6i.

103 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 226 (1962).
104

See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Who's Afraid of the Hated Political Gerrymander?, 104 KY. LJ.

56I, 562, 566 (2OI6).
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ex ante rules to cabin the discretion of courts and preclude judges from
using their public policy preferences to decide claims of political rights.
As Justice Scalia declared emphatically, but also confusingly, in Vieth,
the judicial power under Article III requires that "judicial action must
be governed by standard, by rule. ' 10 5 "Rule" is meant to qualify "standard." Given that there is no rule available, that is, a "reasoned distinction[]" to constrain judicial discretion and policy preferences, the federal
10 6
courts do not have power to hear these claims.
This emphasis on rules was a leading theme in Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Bandemer, where she derided "the nebulous standard a plurality of the Court fashions today,"107 a standard that would allow the
Court to enact its public policy choices into law. The Bandemer plurality argued that it was simply following the path of Baker, which made
reapportionment claims justiciable and subject to equal protection
standards.1 08 But in Justice O'Connor's view, the standard developed
in Baker was deeply flawed. She argued that Baker adopted a nebulous
"arbitrary and capricious" standard that "threatened to prove unmanageable," save for the fact that "the difficulty was pretermitted when a
relatively simple and judicially manageable requirement of population
equality among districts was adopted ... in Reynolds v. Sims." 10 9
Baker, like the plurality in Bandemer, relied upon a nebulous standard,
whereas Reynolds 110 fashioned a rule. From Justice O'Connor's perspective, the best the plurality could do was to emulate Baker, which
was not good enough.1 11 Thus, political gerrymandering claims were
112
not justiciable because no rule was available.
B. Gill as Placeholder
Using the framework of the narrative of nonintervention, we can
better understand the Court's decision in Gill v. Whitford. Nominally,
Gill is a standing case. In order to have standing, a plaintiff must show
(a) that she has suffered an injury in fact; (b) that the defendant caused
the plaintiff's injury; and (c) that the injury is redressable if the plaintiff
prevails.113 The most important element is the injury-in-fact requirement, which the Court has interpreted to mean that the plaintiff must
plead and show that the defendant's conduct has infringed upon ''a
105
106
107
108
109
110

Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Id.
478 U.S. at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at i-8 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 149 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

III See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 155 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
112 Id. at 147 ("The Equal Protection Clause does not supply judicially manageable standards for
resolving purely political gerrymandering claims.").
113 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929.

2018]

THE SUPREME COURT-

COMMENTS

legally protected interest. ' 114 Chief Justice Roberts relied upon the
plaintiffs' own theory and articulation of their constitutional harm to
argue that the plaintiffs' "legally protected interest" was the dilution (to
borrow from the racial gerrymandering context) or debasement (to borrow a term from the reapportionment context) of their vote for partisan
purposes. 1 5 Because Republicans were in charge of the redistricting
process, they placed plaintiffs, who identified as Democrats, inside and
outside of legislative districts - packed and cracked them - in order
to maximize the electoral power of the Republican Party and thereby
minimize the plaintiffs' voting power. 1 1 6 The Court then went on to
conclude unanimously that in order to have standing to challenge the
redistricting plan, plaintiffs must show that they live in districts that are
either packed or cracked, and that the cracking or packing results in the
debasement or dilution of their vote. 1 1' Chief Justice Roberts argued
that the plaintiffs did not show that they resided in districts that were
packed or cracked, so they did not prove that they suffered an injury in
fact.1 18 Consequently, they did not have standing to bring this claim.
Though a case about standing, Gill bears the markers of the narrative of nonintervention. The Court relied on both the law-politics and
individual rights-structural rights dichotomies, particularly the latter, as
necessary complements of its standing argument. Invoking both distinctions, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the plaintiffs' case "is a case
about group political interests, not individual legal rights .... The
Court's constitutionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual
rights of the people appearing before it. '' 119 In stating the importance
of standing, the Court invoked the law-politics distinction: standing is a
"threshold requirement [that] 'ensures that we act as judges, and do not
120
engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.'
' 12 1
And in support of the argument that standing is "district specific,
the
Court quoted the reapportionment cases to argue that the "right to vote
is 'individual and personal in nature. 1122 Importantly, the Court stated
numerous times that the standing inquiry is not focused on structural
harms such as the plaintiffs' "collective representation in the legislature"
or their interest in "influencing the legislature's overall 'composition and

114 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56o (1992)).
115

Id. at

116 Id.
117 Id.

118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122

at
at
at
at
at
at

Id. at

1929-30.

1930.
1930-31.
I931-32.
I933.
1923

(quoting Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013)).

1930.
1929

(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 56I (1964)).
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policymaking,' ' 123 or their "abstract interest in policies adopted by the
'124
legislature.
Yet, the Court's standing analysis left open some unanswered questions. Two particular points are worth noting. First, scholars of the law
of democracy universally agree that vote dilution claims are structural
claims and not individual rights claims.1 25 Take for example the cracking claim - the contention that the state broke apart a group of voters
who would otherwise have constituted a majority of voters in the district
and as a consequence made it impossible for those voters, who are now
a numerical minority, to elect their candidate of choice. A cracking
claim is sensible only as a group right.1 26 As long as an individual is not
denied the right to vote, all claims about the composition of the electorate, including racial gerrymandering, malapportionment, and partisan gerrymandering, are structural claims.127 The individual rightsstructural rights distinction is not a coherent distinction.1 28
Second, Gill is unclear about the relationship between standing and
the constitutional harm. As Professors Issacharoff and Karlan stated in
an analogous context, "a coherent concept of standing grows out of a
clear definition of the relevant injury. '129 We put the cart before the
horse when we talk about standing without defining the injury.130 Gill
is an anomaly in the Court's law and politics jurisprudence as the rare
case where the Court has addressed the question of standing without
first addressing whether there is a constitutional or legal claim. Prior to
Gill, standing doctrine had not been determinative in any of the Court's
forays into the political thicket. Standing did not matter when the Court
decided the reapportionment cases;1 31 or when the Court intervened in

123 Id. at 1931 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 31, Gill, 138 S. Ct. igi6 (No. i6-ii6i)).
124 Id.

125 Perhaps the foundational article here is Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and RaceConscious Districting:A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1589, 1636 (1993). See
also Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663,
1727 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 58 U. MLAMI L. REV. 35, 40-42, 45 (2003).

126 This is also true for packing claims.
127 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: PartisanLockups of
the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 645-46 (1998); Richard H. Pildes, Commentary, The
Theory of PoliticalCompetition, 85 VA. L. REV. 16o5, i6o6 (i999).
128 For an important account, see Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2oo3 Term - Foreword:
The Constitutionalizationof DemocraticPolitics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 55-83 (2004).
129 Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Commentary, Standing and Misunderstanding in
Voting Rights Law, iii HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2288 (1998).
130 Justice Kagan recognized this problem in her concurring opinion when she noted that the
lower court will have to decide what evidence is relevant for the plaintiffs to show standing "without
guidance from this Court[ on] what elements make up a vote dilution claim in the partisan gerrymandering context." Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1937 (Kagan, J., concurring).
131 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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the 2000 presidential election in Bush v. Gore. 132 Standing did not matter when the Court recognized an "analytically distinct" claim in Shaw
v. Reno, 133 the racial gerrymandering case. 134 Indeed, in the Shaw line
of cases, the Court first decided whether there was a constitutional injury - which has been understood as an "expressive harm" 135 - and
then two years later, in United States v. Hays, 136 addressed the standing
question. 137
How then can we make sense of the Court's decision in Gill to decide
the case on standing grounds? In our view, the Court's standing analysis
reflects a skepticism of some members of the Court and a deep disagreement about the justiciability of the plaintiffs' claim, a skepticism rooted
in the narrative of nonintervention. Standing doctrine is a prudential
artifact that allows the justices to take up and evade questions as they
deem necessary and appropriate.138 Chief Justice Roberts's opinion is
peppered with aphorisms that serve as admonitions about the limits and
limitations of the Court's power.139 A unanimous decision on standing
by a Court that is clearly divided on the justiciability of these claims
reflects a Court that is not yet ready to square up to the justiciability
question. Characterizing Gill as a standing case blithely masks the
Court's deep ambivalence and disagreement with respect to the merits
of the case.
Ambivalence, however, has two sides. Although it is true that the
Court has strong reservations about entering this part of the political
thicket, it is also true that the Court is not yet ready to abdicate this
field altogether. The Court could have followed the nonintervention
script and dismissed these cases on the ground that there are no judicially manageable standards. In the alternative, it could have remanded
the case to the lower court with instructions to dismiss on jurisdictional
grounds, as Justices Thomas and Gorsuch believed was required by

132

531 U.S. 98 (2000).

133 509 U.S. 630 ('993).
134 Id. at 652.

135 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.L. REV. 483, 5o6
(1-993).
136 515 U.S. 737 (i995).

137 Id. at 738-39.
138 See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:The Transformationand
Disappearanceof the PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, So N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1204-05 (2002).
139 See, e.g., Gill, -38 S. Ct. at 1929 ("Our power as judges... is... grounded in and limited by
the necessity of resolving, according to legal principles, a plaintiff's particular claim of legal right.");
id. (noting that standing functions "[t]o ensure that the Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper and properly limited - role of the courts in a democratic society"' (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750 (1984))).
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longstanding precedents. 140 Instead, by refusing to shut the door altogether, the Court gave all political gerrymandering plaintiffs - not
just the Gill plaintiffs - another bite at the apple on the theory that
"[t]his is not the usual case. It concerns an unsettled kind of claim this
Court has not agreed upon, the contours and justiciability of which are
14 1
unresolved."
Deciding Gill on standing grounds and remanding the case is a
holding-pattern maneuver. The Court is deadlocked on justiciability,
ambivalent about where to go next. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged as much. 142 The Court is clearly not yet persuaded that there is
an injury or that it has a role to play in addressing that injury, but it
also has some intuition that nonintervention is a significant abdication
of judicial responsibility. In order to follow that intuition, it needs to
shed the burden of the narrative of nonintervention.

C. The Critique
This narrative of nonintervention has served as a conceptual and
ultimately doctrinal straightjacket for proponents of judicial review of
partisan gerrymandering claims. The narrative of nonintervention relies upon supposedly categorical distinctions that are presented as outcome determinative when they are not. Examples of the permeability
of the categories, and how they simply reflect a default assumption of
nonintervention, abound.
Take first the race-party pairing, the argument that the Court is authorized to protect racial minorities but not political parties. In Giles v.
Harris, the Court refused to intervene in order to protect the rights of
African Americans. 143 But in Lane v. Wilson, 144 a case indistinguishable
from Giles, Justice Frankfurter wrote an opinion preventing Oklahoma
from doing to African American voters precisely what it allowed Alabama
to do in Giles.145 Justice Frankfurter attempted to distinguish the two
140 See id. at 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
141 Id. at '933-34 (majority opinion).

142 As he stated, "o]ver the past five decades this Court has been repeatedly asked to decide what
judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution sets on the gerrymandering of voters along
partisan lines .... Our efforts to sort through those considerations have generated conflicting views
both of how to conceive of the injury arising from partisan gerrymandering and of the appropriate
role for the Federal Judiciary in remedying that injury." Id. at 1926.
143 -89 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
144 307 U.S. 268 (1939).

145 In Lane, an African American citizen of Oklahoma, LW. Lane, sued county officials for denying him the right to register and vote because he was black. Id. at 271. Mr. Lane was the victim
of a registration scheme that used a grandfather clause to allow white voters to register for life but
to disenfranchise black voters. Id. The grandfather clause was struck down in Guinn v. United
States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), but it was essentially reenacted with the same effect. Lane, 307 U.S. at

269-71. Following Guinn, Oklahoma enacted a statute that allowed those disenfranchised by the
grandfather clause the opportunity to register if they did so between April 3o and May ii, 1916.
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cases on the grounds that Lane was about racial discrimination and
Giles was about political participation. 146 Given the factual similarities
1 47
between the two cases, that distinction is patently unpersuasive.
Moreover, even if Justice Frankfurter could distinguish Giles from Lane,
he could not distinguish Giles from Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 148 a case in
which African American plaintiffs challenged Alabama's redistricting
scheme that removed almost all of the black residents from the City of
Tuskegee. 14 9 Justice Frankfurter authored the opinion for the Court in
Gomillion and reversed the lower court's decision that the plaintiffs'
complaint was nonjusticiable.1 5 0 Justice Frankfurter concluded that the
plaintiffs were entitled to vindicate their right to equal treatment and
right to vote guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
respectively. 151 Following Gomillion, there was no longer any doubt
that race cases - even those alleging political rights, such as the right
15 2
to vote - were firmly within the Court's ambit.
Turn now to the rules-standards dichotomy. Why was race on one
side of the dichotomy in 1903,153 but on the other side in 1939154 and
I960?155 Why was malapportionment on one side of the dichotomy in
1946 in Colegrove,15 6 but on the other side in 1962 in Baker?15 7 We
Id. at
Id. at

270-71.

If they failed to register during that time period, they were disenfranchised for life.

271.

146 Lane, 307 U.S. at 274 ("The basis of this action is inequality of treatment.., not denial of the
right to vote.").
147 For a further detailed argument that Justice Frankfurter's attempt to distinguish Giles and
Lane is unpersuasive, see Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 MICH. L. REV. o99,
I12-2 3 (2005) (book review).
148 364 U.S. 339 (196o).
149 Id. at 340.
150 Id. at 347-48.
151 See id. at 342-47.
152 The Court's difficulty with clearly distinguishing race cases from politics or party cases is the
reason why many scholars have argued that the distinction between racial gerrymandering and
political gerrymandering is incoherent. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer,
Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the
VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1559, 1596 (2o18); Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party,
or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and
Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1837, '849-56 (2018); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering
and Political Cartels, ii6 HARV. L. REV. 593, 63o-31 (2002). For a wonderful rejoinder, see Ellen
D. Katz, Reviving the Right to Vote, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163, 1163-66 (2007) (defending the racialization of partisan claims).
153 Giles v. Harris, -89 U.S. 475, 486-88 (19o3) (declaring a rule that equity could not step in for
the state to enforce political rights such as voting registration).
154 Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) (holding for plaintiffs under a standard that determined that a statute bore too close a resemblance to a grandfather clause that was invalid under
the Fifteenth Amendment).
155 Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 346-48 (applying a legal standard that found that a state discriminated
based on race).
156 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (declaring a rule against justiciability).
157 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 209 (1962) (holding that malapportionment cases were justiciable).
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cannot explain these cases on rules-standards terms. Note that Justice
Holmes's reason for noninterference in Giles is almost identical to that
provided by Justice Frankfurter more than forty years later in Colegrove,
except for the fact that Colegrove was about malapportionment and not
race. It is the same story that Justices O'Connor and Scalia told in
Bandemer and Vieth, respectively, except that those cases were not
about race or malapportionment, which were by then within the purview of judicial review, but about partisan gerrymandering, which was
decidedly not. In 1903, the Court would not intervene to protect African
Americans against the deprivation of their political rights - until the
Court did; because this was a problem of the political process - until it
was not. In I946, the Court would not intervene to protect voters
against the debasement of their vote by malapportionment - until the
Court did; because this was a problem of the political process - until it
was not.
The argument about judicially manageable standards is inapposite
here because the Court did not develop or rely on any new standards in
Lane or Gomillion. Rather, the Court simply told the local white communities so feared by Justice Holmes in Giles to stop discriminating.
The Court also did not develop judicially manageable standards between Colegrove and Baker. Recall Justice O'Connor's point that when
the Court decided that malapportionment claims were justiciable in
Baker, it did so without a judicially manageable standard. 158 The Court
15 9
did not "discover" one until Reynolds v. Sims, two years later.
Consider these cases in the context of the politics-law dichotomy. If
the Court's change in posture in Lane, with respect to race, and Baker,
with respect to malapportionment, was not a function of the availability
of "judicially manageable standards," does this then mean that the Court
was doing politics in Lane and Gomillion? No one today lauds Justice
Holmes's decision in Giles.160 By contrast, the Court's decisions in Lane
and Gomillion have few detractors. Similarly, though no one today
questions the appropriateness of judicial review of malapportionment,
are we to conclude that Baker is an unconstitutional intervention in
democratic politics because there were no judicially manageable standards when the Court decided the case?
Finally, take the rights-structure divide. Recall Justice O'Connor's
characterization of the reapportionment cases in Bandemer as cases that
vindicated individual rights and not structural rights. 16 1 This characterization is understandable, yet striking. It is understandable because
a contrary conclusion would have compelled Justice O'Connor to con-

158

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. -09, 148 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

159 See 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
160 See, e.g., Pildes, supra note 33, at 305-07.

161 478 U.S. at 149-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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cede the argument to Justice White in Bandemer that the reapportionment cases were controlling precedent and thus that political gerrymandering cases ought to be justiciable. Given the similarities between reapportionment claims and partisan gerrymandering claims, opponents
of judicial review of partisan gerrymandering claims are continually
tasked with distinguishing them. We can understand why Justice
O'Connor would view the reapportionment cases as individual rights
cases.
However, Justice O'Connor's characterization of reapportionment
claims as individual rights claims is a reclassification of the reapportionment cases and betrays a core element of Justice Frankfurter's objection,
in Colegrove and Baker, to judicial intervention in reapportionment
cases. Justice Frankfurter's main argument against justiciability was
that reapportionment claims were structural claims - claims that challenged the structural arrangements of representative institutions. As he
stated in Colegrove, the basis for the harm was not that an individual
was deprived of a right to vote, but that the state suffered harm as a
polity.162 As many commentators have argued, Justice Frankfurter was
certainly right that apportionment claims (along with race claims and
political gerrymandering claims) are structural claims and not individual rights claims. 163 By reclassifying the reapportionment cases as individual rights claims in her Bandemer opinion, Justice O'Connor essentially moved the goalposts.
The narrative of nonintervention is like a fairy tale, and contains an
important lesson: the Court must be concerned about its legitimacy and
political capital. 164 Not surprisingly, Justice Frankfurter famously articulated the point in his dissent in Baker:
The Court's authority - possessed of neither the purse nor the sword ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such
feeling must be nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and
in appearance, from political entanglements and by abstention from inject165
ing itself into the clash of political forces in political settlements.

162 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) ("This is not an action to recover for damage
because of the discriminatory exclusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other citizens. The
basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a polity. In effect this
is an appeal to the federal courts to reconstruct the electoral process of Illinois in order that it may
be adequately represented in the councils of the Nation." (citations omitted)).
163 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the
DoctrinalInterregnum, I53 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 51-112 (2004).
164 As Professor John Hart Ely put it, the Court's concern is that the idea that it should supervise
the ground rules of democratic politics is "unusually calculated to get the Court in trouble, dangerously to decrease its prestige." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUSr. A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 121 (-980).

165 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. i86, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This led Justice Clark to
retort: "National respect for the courts is more enhanced through the forthright enforcement of
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Chief Justice Roberts also articulated his worry in Gill in similar
terms. As he stated at oral argument, unless the Court can explain to
the "intelligent man on the street" why it is adjudicating partisan claims,
the Court risks "caus[ing] very serious harm to the status and integrity
'166
of the decisions of this Court in the eyes of the country.
However, the narrative does not decide actual cases. It simply reflects the Court's conclusion that the Constitution does not provide judicially manageable standards for resolving political gerrymandering
claims - a conclusion whose terms are offered as a magical incantation
designed to ward off the evil spirit of judicial intervention. Because the
categories do not do the analytical work that the Court assumes they do,
the narrative of nonintervention sends putative plaintiffs on a fool's errand. As the Court appears to cry out for satisfactory standards, plaintiffs willingly offer anything and everything that has the possibility of
bringing respite, like parents attempting to placate a fussy baby, only to
have the baby petulantly spit out any and all offerings while demanding
more.

II.

JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN THE

AGE OF PARTISANSHIP

Scholars of law and democracy have advanced a number of justifications for judicial supervision of the ground rules of democratic politics. 167 These justifications share one common theme: they identify a
pathology within the political process and urge the Court to provide a
remedy because the political process is unable to fix itself. 168 However,
these theories misunderstand the narrative of nonintervention. While
they do a very good job of articulating why political gerrymandering is
bad for the political process, they are nonetheless unresponsive to the
Court's core concern. The Court is not asking whether judicial engagement would be good for the political process - in fact, it eschews that
inquiry - it is asking whether judicial engagement is bad for the Court.
Additionally, the theories treat the Court as if it resides outside the political process, unaffected by the pathology identified within the system.
This is a view "of the Court as a deus ex machina, an exogenous force,
the god that would deliver us all from the predicaments created by our
political rulers. ' 169 Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule identify
[representational] rights rather than by rendering them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuges." Id. at 262 (Clark, J., concurring).
166 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 38.
167 See, e.g., Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L.J. 1411 (2008).
168 E.g., id. at 1416-17.
169

Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Reynolds Reconsidered, 67 ALA. L. REV. 485,

525 (2015).
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this problem as the "inside/outside fallacy." 17 0 Thus, the theories are
incomplete in at least two respects: they are not responsive to the Court's
core concern - that intervention is bad for the Court - and they do
not avoid the inside/outside fallacy.
In this Part, we respond to both shortcomings. We argue that if the
Justices are concerned about judicial restraint and how the mass public
perceives the Court, they must, paradoxically, curb partisan gerrymandering as a way of limiting the partisan manipulation of electoral rules
across other domains of election law. In a political environment characterized by tribal or negative partisanship,17 1 political elites have a
stronger incentive to rig electoral rules to maximize a favorable outcome. 17 2 Political losers will turn to the courts to vindicate their rights.
As a consequence, the courts will be continually enmeshed in partisan
fights. A rule against partisan excess in the gerrymandering context
might not simply limit partisanship in gerrymandering but might also
eliminate it in related domains, which would save the Court from having
to referee these secondary partisan fights. Just as importantly, the Court
cannot evade questions of partisan bias as simply as some Justices might
wish. While Chief Justice Roberts openly worried that judicial involvement might lead "the intelligent man on the street"'17 3 to perceive the
Court as partisan, he should be concerned about noninvolvement as a
170 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 8o U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1745 (2013).

As they explain, the fallacy occurs when theorists flip between "an external
perspective that attempts to explain the behavior of actors within the constitutional order as an
endogenous product of self-interested aims, and an internal perspective that assumes the standpoint
of the judge and asks how the judge ought to behave so as to promote the well-being of the constitutional system and the nation." Id. at 1744; see also id. at 1745.
171 Professor Justin Levitt defines tribal partisanship as a preference for "public action purely
because the policy in question is perceived to benefit those with a shared partisan affiliation, or
because the policy in question is perceived to injure partisan opponents, wholly divorced from or stronger yet, contrary to - the policymaker's conception of the policy's other merits." Levitt,
The PartisanshipSpectrum, supra note 28, at 1798.
172 We are not the first to be concerned with the problem that extreme polarization poses to the
various domains of election law. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Commentary, Playing Cards in a
Hurricane:Party Reform in an Age of Polarization,54 Hous. L. REV. 911, 917-20 (2017); Samuel
Issacharoff, CollateralDamage: The Endangered Center in American Politics,46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 415, 424-25 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff, Address, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover
of Our Hollowed-Out PoliticalParties,54 Hous. L. REV. 845, 855 (2017); Kang, supra note 28, at
356; Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties,Not Powers, i9 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2338-41 (2oo6); Levitt, Intent Is Enough, supra note 28, at 2047-51; Levitt, The Partisanship
Spectrum, supra note 28, at i8i6--g; Richard H. Pildes, Feature, Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804, 808-10 (2014);
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in
America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273-74 (201o1); David Schleicher, Things Aren't Going That Well
over There Either. Party Polarizationand Election Law in Comparative Perspective, 2015 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 433, 434-35 (2o5). But whereas others worry about the effects of hyperpartisanship on
the political process, we are concerned with the consequences of hyperpartisanship for the Court
itself.
173 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 37.
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signal to political elites and the mass public that the Court is in fact an
accomplice in "the new politics of voter suppression."'17 4 In enforcing a
rule against partisanship, ironically, the Court will also protect itself
against charges of partisanship. Thus, prohibiting partisanship in gerrymandering is not simply a normative good; it is also an exercise of
judicial restraint by limiting the Court's prospective entanglement in
partisan fights.
Our argument is divided in two parts. The first part describes the
realities of modern democratic practices in our hyperpartisan age. The
second part turns Justice Frankfurter's presumption on its head.
Whereas Justice Frankfurter famously worried about the dangers of intervention, we argue that judicial supervision of political gerrymandering claims is a prudential move that could curb the deployment of partisanship in areas outside of the domain of political gerrymandering.
A. Parties and Partisanshipin Modern American Politics
Classical democratic theory envisions campaigns and elections as
real contests of ideas that ought to turn on substantive issues.17 5 Voters
are expected to vote for candidates and parties depending upon the candidates' and parties' stance on the issues of the day.17 6 Additionally, in
the classical account, the voter is positioned horizontally vis-a-vis her
representative. There is a clear sense of who is the principal - the
voter - and who is the agent - the representative.17 7 Minimalist democratic theories expect much less of voters.178 The role of voters in the
minimalist account is to choose among competitors vying for the right
to exercise political power. 17 9 In either the classical or minimalist account, authority flows from principal to agent. The principal is thought

174 SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006);

see also

CAROL ANDERSON, ONE PERSON,

No

VOTE: HOW VOTER SUP-

PRESSION IS DESTROYING OUR DEMOCRACY (2o18); TOVA ANDREA WANG, THE POLITICS
OF VOTER SUPPRESSION: DEFENDING AND

EXPANDING AMERICANS'

RIGHT TO VOTE

(2012).

175 See, e.g., JAMES

A.

GARDNER, WHAT ARE CAMPAIGNS FOR?: THE ROLE OF PERSUA-

SION IN ELECTORAL LAW AND POLITICS 13 (2009) ("We take it for granted today that campaigns

for elective office ought to be deliberative.

Candidates, we believe, ought to inform voters of the

facts, offer thoughtful positions on serious issues, and work hard to persuade voters of the merits of
their positions and qualifications so as to earn any support they receive.").
176 Professors Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels refer to this as the "folk theory" of democracy. CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY
ELECTIONS Do NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT I (2o16).
177 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries,85 VA. L.
REV. 1627, 1636-39 (1999).
178

See generally ROBERT A.

DAHL,

A

PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 124-37 (1956);

GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 96-11o (1962); JOSEPH
TALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269-83 (1942).

179 See, e.g., SCHUMPETER, supra note 178, at 269.
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to have the capacity to hold the agent accountable, or retroactively approve the decisions of the agent by making a merit-based evaluation of
the agent's decision.18 0 Not to tax our linguistic syntax and our conceptual categories too significantly, modern democratic theory assumes that
the voter is "agentic," a political agent capable of making and expected
to make merit-based decisions.
Notwithstanding the expectations of democratic theory, its assumptions are severely strained by the realities of contemporary democratic
practice. Democratic politics have become so partisan and tribal that,
on average, voters are unlikely to make merit-based evaluations of their
political rulers. Because voters increasingly frame their political evaluations through a partisan lens, we cannot expect them to serve the basic
checking function that our theories of democracy expect of voters.
American political parties and American political elites are more divided along partisan and ideological lines than they have been in a very
long time. 8 1 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, though there
are important dissenting voices,18 2 there is a growing literature demonstrating that polarization among the mass public increasingly mirrors
polarization among the elite.18 3 Americans have sorted themselves into
partisan camps. Taking their cues from the ruling class, voters have

180 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 129, 201 (i98i); HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 47-

48 (1967); Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 515, 516 (2003).
181

See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED

AMERICA 23-24 (2006); Joseph Bafumi & Robert Y. Shapiro, A New PartisanVoter, 71 J. POL. i,
3 (2oo9).
182 See MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL J. ABRAMS, DISCONNECT. THE BREAKDOWN
OF REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 20 (2009); MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, THE
PARTISAN SORT.HOW LIBERALS BECAME DEMOCRATS AND CONSERVATIVES BECAME REPUBLICANS 77 (2oo9); Paul DiMaggio, John Evans & Bethany Bryson, Have Americans' Social
Attitudes Become More Polarized?, 102 AM. J. SOC. 690, 739-45 (1996) (concluding that there has
not been great polarization in public opinion on social issues since the 197os).
183 As one scholar stated clearly and emphatically: "America is polarized. Our political parties
are highly polarized and the American electorate is highly polarized .... The polarization of the
American electorate is real and widespread .... America is a politically divided nation, it has been
so for some time, and has become more so in recent decades." JAMES E. CAMPBELL, POLARIZED:
MAKING SENSE OF A DIVIDED AMERICA 1-2 (2oi6); see also ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE
POLARIZED PUBLIC?: WHY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IS So DYSFUNCTIONAL passim (2013).
One of the best explanations of the phenomenon of polarization is provided by Professor Lilliana
Mason and her account of social polarization. She argues that the emotions and behavior of the
electorate, wholly apart from its members' policy choices, evince increased polarization. LILLIANA
MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT. HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY 77 (2 oi-8). Americans

manifest a distinctive prejudice and anger toward members of the other party "that grows out of
the increasing alignment between our partisan, ideological, racial, and religious social identities."
Id. She observes that "[a]n electorate that increasingly treats its political opponents as enemies,
with ever-growing levels of prejudice, offensive action, and anger, is a clear sign of partisan polarization occurring within the citizenry." Id.
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aligned their political ideology with the appropriate political party.18 4
On average, conservatives are also Republicans and liberals are also
Democrats.18 5 There is also very strong evidence that the more politically knowledgeable or engaged members of the public are undeniably
polarized and virtually indistinguishable from political elites.18 6 Additionally, our partisan identities also correspond with our social and
demographic identities. 8 7 On average, you are likely a Democrat if
you are a person of color (African American, Latino, Asian, or Native
American), or a gender minority, or Jewish, or secular, or young. 188 Conversely, you are likely a Republican if you are white, or older, or an
evangelical Protestant, or living in certain parts of the country18i 9 As
the author of a recent and comprehensive study explained:
The American electorate has sorted itself into two increasingly homogenous
parties, with a variety of social, economic, geographic, and ideological cleavages falling in line with the partisan divide. This creates two megaparties,
with each party representing not only policy positions but also an increasing
list of other social cleavages. Parties, then, draw convenient battle lines
between an array of social groups. 190
Political scientists and political psychologists have identified two different types of partisan divisions. The first is ideological polarization,
which describes the fact that Americans are predictably divided along

184 MORRIS P. FIORINA WITH SAMUEL

J. ABRAMS

& JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?:

THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 11-32 (3 d ed. 2011); LEVENDUSKY, supra note 182, at

77; Marc J. Hetherington, Resurgent Mass Partisanship:The Role of Elite Polarization, 95 AM.
POL. SCi. REV. 619, 622-23, 627-29 (2001).

185 See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note I83, at 145-46; LEVENDUSKY, supra note 182.
186 ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER: ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 15-61 (2010).

187 For thorough treatments, see ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT. RACE,
PARTY TRANSFORMATION, AND THE RISE OF DONALD TRUMP 101-20 (2018); MASON, supra

note 183, at 61-77.
188 See PEW RES. CTR., A DEEP DIVE INTO PARTY AFFILIATION: SHARP DIFFERENCES
BY RACE, GENDER, GENERATION, EDUCATION I (2015). On the relationship between religion
and partisan identity, see ABRAMOWITZ, supra note I83, at 68-77; JAMES DAVISON HUNTER,
CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 42-48 (i9i);
GEOFFREY LAYMAN,
THE GREAT DIVIDE: RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS

68-74 (2ooi); Geoffrey C. Layman, Religion and PoliticalBehavior in the United States: The Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment from 'p8o to 1994, 6i PUB. OPINION Q. 288, 295
(I997). On the relationship between race and partisan identity, see generally EDWARD G.
CARMINES & JAMES A. STIMSON, ISSUE EVOLUTION: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 47-54 (I989); Maruice Mangum, The Racial Underpinnings of Party
Identificationand PoliticalIdeology, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1222 (2013). On gender, see Barry C. Burden,
The Social Roots of the Partisan Gender Gap, 72 PUB. OPINION Q. 55, 56-6o (2008); Karen M.
Kaufmann, Culture Wars, Secular Realignment, and the Gender Gap in Party Identification, 24
POL. BEHAV. 283, 285-86 (2002).
189 See sources cited supra note 188.
190 MASON, supra note 183, at 19-20.
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ideological and partisan lines. 191 The second is affective or social polarization, which describes the fact that Americans are at least as much
divided by their sociodemographic identities as their policy differences. 192 The title of a recent paper identified the emotion that opposing
partisans have for each other as "[flear and [loathing. '' 193 And if the
title were not sufficiently alarming, the well-respected researchers concluded that: "Compared with the most salient social divide in American
society - race - partisanship elicits more extreme evaluations and behavioral responses to ingroups and outgroups. '' 194 Partisan animus rivals, and perhaps surpasses, racial animus in both belief and motivation
for behavior. This is due to the nonapplicability of egalitarian norms:
These norms, which are supported by large majorities, discourage the manifestation of behavior that may be construed as discriminatory. In contemporary America, the strength of these norms has made virtually any discussion of racial differences a taboo subject to the point that citizens suppress
their true feelings. No such constraints apply to evaluations of partisan
groups. 195
Put differently, though not less alarmingly, "American partisans to' 96
day are prone to stereotyping, prejudice, and emotional volatility."1
"These phenomena are increasing quickly" and are "defined by prejudice, anger, and activism on behalf of that prejudice and anger."1 97 Partisans hate each other.
Not surprisingly, partisans respond to facts differently and interpret
facts consistently with their partisan priors. As a political scientist strikingly noted, "partisanship is a powerful and pervasive influence on perceptions of political events.' '19 s We live in a political environment in
which it makes less and less sense to inquire about what Americans
think of a particular public policy issue. Voters understand their position on the issues of the day through their partisan identities and take
their cues on public policy issues from political elites.199 Political psychologists and political scientists have explained the role of partisanship
191

See, e.g.,

ABRAMOWITZ,

supra note I83, at 36-6i.

192 See, e.g., MASON, supra note I83, at 32-44; Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes,
-

Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization,76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405, 405
07 (2012); Shanto Iyengar & Sean J. Westwood, Fearand Loathing Across Party Lines: New Evidence on Group Polarization,59 AM. J. POL. ScI. 69o, 703-05 (2015).
193
194
195
196

Iyengar & Westwood, supra note
Id. at 703.
Id. at 704 (citation omitted).
MASON, supra note I83, at 4.

192.

197 Id.

198 Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: PartisanBias in PoliticalPerceptions,24 POL.
BEHAV. I17, 120 (2002).

199 See, e.g., id. at 138; James N. Druckman et al., How Elite PartisanPolarizationAffects Public
Opinion, 107 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 57, 74 (2013); Peter K. Enns & Gregory E. McAvoy, The Role of
Partisanship in Aggregate Opinion, 34 POL. BEHAV. 627, 648 (2012); Geoffrey Evans & Mark
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in political decisionmaking as largely attributable to partisan-motivated
reasoning. 20 0 According to one prominent study:
[P]artisans in a polarized environment follow their party regardless of the
type or strength of the argument that the party makes. Moreover, when
individuals engage in strong partisan motivated reasoning, they develop increased confidence in their opinions. This means they are less likely to
consider alternative positions and more likely to take action based on their

opinion.

20 1

Thus, the relevant inquiry is not: What do Americans think about a
particular issue? Rather, the inquiry is: What do Republicans and
Democrats think? Furthermore, what the rank-and-file Republican or
Democrat thinks about a particular public policy issue is often strongly
influenced, if not determined, by the cues the rank and file receive from
2 2
partisan elites and how the issue has been framed by these elites.
To be sure, the use of partisanship as a basis for evaluation can be
normatively defended. 20 3 For example, parties are useful heuristics that
minimize the voter's information deficit. However, when partisanship
becomes the exclusive basis for substantive evaluations, voters are not
expected to provide democratic accountability. My party is correct20 4
because it is my party - right or wrong.

Pickup, Reversing the Causal Arrow: The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions in the
2000-2004 U.S. PresidentialElection Cycle, 72 J. POL. 1236, 1247 (2OO); Brian J. Gaines et al.,
Same Facts, Different Interpretations:PartisanMotivation and Opinion on Iraq, 69 J. POL. 957,
971-72 (2007); Paul Goren, Character Weakness, PartisanBias, and PresidentialEvaluation, 46
AM. J. POL. ScI. 627, 628-29, 637-39 (2002); Jennifer Jerit & Jason Barabas, PartisanPerceptual
Bias and the Information Environment, 74 J. POL. 672, 681-82 (2012).
200 See, e.g., Toby Bolsen et al., The Influence of PartisanMotivated Reasoning on Public Opinion, 36 POL. BEHAV. 235, 251-52 (2014). For a particularly insightful exploration of the phenomena, see Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT
& DECISION MAKING 407 (2013).

201 Druckman et al., supra note 199, at 74 (citations omitted).
202 On the role of elite opinion in foreign policy, see Richard A. Brody & Catherine R. Shapiro,
Policy Failure and Public Support: The Iran-ContraAffair and Public Assessment of President
Reagan, ii POL. BEHAV. 353 (1989).
203 See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN APPRECIATION

OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP 333-48 (2008); Lisa Disch, Toward a Mobilization Conception of
DemocraticRepresentation,1o5 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 100, 101-02 (2011). For a parsimonious review
of the normative defense of this practice, see Thomas J. Leeper & Rune Slothuus, PoliticalParties,
Motivated Reasoning, and Public Opinion Formation, 35 ADVANCES POL. PSYCHOL. 129, 13233 (2o14).
204 For a trenchant take on the accountability problem with respect to economic performance,
see Christopher J. Anderson, The End of Economic Voting?: Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits
of DemocraticAccountability, io ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 2 71, 281-86 (2007). As one political scientist
remarked, dryly, "[i]f partisans simply bend reality to make it fit their preconceptions, holding incumbents accountable ... seems rather difficult." Martin Bisgaard, Bias Will Find a Way: Economic Perceptions,Attributions of Blame, and Partisan-MotivatedReasoning During Crisis, 77 J.
POL. 849, 849 (2015) (citations omitted).
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Thus, voters cannot be counted on to be an effective check on the
exercise of power by political elites. Indeed, representatives and institutions of representation are not expected to conform to the preferences
of the citizen. Instead the citizen is expected to be responsive to the
political preferences of her political leaders.2 0 5 The voters' role here is
purely instrumental: to allow political elites to lay claim to the legitimate
exercise of power because they tallied more votes than their political
opponents.
Within its proper framework, partisanship is instrumental to democratic politics by, inter alia, organizing ideas, mobilizing people, achieving policy goals, giving a voice to citizens, and providing a vehicle to
ambitious political elites to channel their political goals.2 0 6 In this view,
partisanship serves the aims of democratic politics, not the other way
around. Partisanship ought to facilitate representation.20
From this perspective, we can easily link the problem of partisanship
to the problem of political gerrymandering. Leaving aside the material
harm that partisan gerrymandering causes, 20 it also violates a norm of
constitutional morality both because the practice communicates to political elites that the only thing that matters is partisanship and also
because it treats citizens as mere instruments to the ambitions of political elites. Partisanship becomes its own self-justifying appeal. Instead
of partisanship being instrumental to the political representation of citizens, citizens become instrumental, as ciphers devoid of political agency,
9
to the acquisition of political power by political elites.20
It is true that one can then say that gerrymandered districts are responsive to the preferences of the majority of citizens and representative

205 See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES:

A

CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 179-8i, 208-ii

(I989).
206 For an introduction, see generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES: THE ORIGIN AND
TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 28-6i ('995); see also Nathaniel

Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of PoliticalParties:A Reassessment of Competing Paradigms, i00 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 787 (2000) (examining the place of political parties within the legal
landscape).
207 The legal status of parties and thus partisanship must be dependent upon their functional
utility for democratic politics. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Toward a FunctionalDefense of Political
Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 814 (2001); see also Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken,
The Party's Over. McCutcheon, Shadow Parties,and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. CT.
REV. 175, 199-208.

208 This is the harm inherent to malapportionment, or vote dilution more generally. See STEPHEN
ANSOLABEHERE & JAMES M. SNYDER JR., THE END OF INEQUALITY: ONE PERSON, ONE
VOTE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 17 (2008) (documenting the ma-

terial harms to American politics from malapportionment and the "resulting dramatic changes in
political power and public policies that resulted from the Court's decisions").
209 This is a form of paternalism that is despotic because it deprives the represented of their
autonomy. See NADIA URBINATI, REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 103 (2006) (explaining this

Kantian account of representation).
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of the views of the electorate. 210 But as Professor Hanna Pitkin notes,
there is a "difference between changing subjects to suit [the] ruler, and
changing the ruler to suit his subjects. '2 11 And, "[a]djusting what is to
represent until it is aligned with what is to be represented may be a part
of the activity of representing, but the converse adjustment is not. The
leader who molds his followers to suit his aims and interests is, if anything, making them represent him. '2 12 Partisan gerrymandering gets it
exactly backward: it does not allow representatives to conform to the
preferences of the electorate or face their retrospective judgment, but
rather, it enables representatives to choose the electorate to conform to
their preferences.
Election law has long been concerned with this instrumental view of
representation. 2 13 Reynolds v. Sims, in which plaintiffs challenged the
malapportionment of Alabama's state legislative districts, 2 14 evinced a
clear concern for the political agency of the represented. "Legislators,"
Chief Justice Warren wrote for the Court, "are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests. '215 In a key passage, Chief Justice
Warren argued that "representative government is in essence selfgovernment.., and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation. '2 16 More importantly, "[tlo the extent
2 17
that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.
Reynolds has been criticized for its reliance on an individual rights
framework, and perhaps rightly so. 21" But Reynolds is iconic in part
because it is animated by the classical account of representation in
which voters are expected to have the capacity to choose and do in fact
choose their representatives. "As long as ours is a representative form
of government," the Court stated, "and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and directly representative of
the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion
is a bedrock of our political system. '2 19 Reynolds, like the Court's other
apportionment cases and its racial gerrymandering cases, reminds us
that judicial intervention is necessary whenever the government attempts to change the subjects to suit the ruler, as opposed to allowing
the subjects to pick their rulers. This is the traditional way of thinking
about the problem of partisan gerrymandering. In the following section,
210 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial
Acquiescence to Incumbent-ProtectingGerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 66o, 672
211 PITKIN, supra note i8o, at io8.

(2002).

212 Id. at iio.

213 For a critical account, see Bertrall L. Ross

II,

The Representative Equality Principle:Dis-

aggregatingthe Equal ProtectionIntent Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 202-03 (2012).
214 377 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1964).

215 Id. at 562.
216 Id. at 5 65.
217 Id. at 567.
218 See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 152, at 630-31.
219 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
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we offer a new way of justifying judicial intervention that links partisan
gerrymandering to the broader questions in election law.

B. Judicial Intervention as Restraint, Nonintervention as Partisan
Models of judicial review in the field of election law generally depict
the Court as a democratic savior, willing and able to save our politics
from its worst excesses. However, as we show in Part I, the Court has
been at times reluctant, almost callously so, to address the structural
pathologies of the democratic process. This reluctance, prominently articulated by Justice Frankfurter, counsels against the Court placing itself
as a referee of partisan politics because to do so would harm the Court.
Justiciability of law and politics claims would involve the Court continually in partisan disputes, which would threaten its legitimacy.
However, the proposition that the Court can refrain from refereeing
partisan disputes by abstaining from supervising the ground rules of
democratic politics is belied by our partisan era. Given the hyperpartisanship of our current political environment, in which political elites
attempt to manipulate or rig electoral rules, norms, and practices in order to maximize their desired political outcomes, 220 the courts will be
continually enmeshed in partisan fights. This is the political reality of
our moment. Partisans will manipulate electoral lines, implement strict
voter identification rules, purge voting rolls, change voting hours, move
polling places, modify registration rules, and so forth, for partisan
gains. 2 1 Like birds of a feather, manipulative devices flock together.
A central lesson from the Court's experience with reapportionment
frames our argument. Reflecting in his memoirs on what he considered
to be the greatest case of his judicial tenure, Chief Justice Warren did
2 22 the case that many consider
not cite Brown v. Board of Education,
the most important and consequential case of the Warren Court, but Baker
v. Carr and the one-person, one-vote cases. 2 23 If African Americans had
been able to vote, the Brown decision would not have been as momentous. 2 24 As Chief Justice Warren reasoned, if Congress had passed

220 See RICHARD HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE NEXT ELEC-

TION MELTDOWN 75-104 (2012); Ryan P. Haygood, The Past as Prologue:Defending Democracy
Against Voter Suppression Tactics on the Eve of the 2012 Elections, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. ioi9,
1028-58 (2012).
221 See, e.g., Ari Berman, There Are 868 Fewer Places to Vote in 2o±6Because the Supreme Court
Gutted the Voting Rights Act, THE NATION (Nov. 4, 2o6), https://www.thenation.com/article/
there-are-868-fewer-places-to-vote-in-20i6-because-the-supreme-court-gutted-the-voting-rights-act/
[https:Hperma.cc/MYL 4 -GRGZ]; Vann R. Newkirk II, Voter Suppression Is Warping Democracy,

THE ATLANTIC (July 17, 2o8), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-

voter-suppression/565355/ [https:Hperma.cc/SgZH-JXF3].
222 347 U.S. 483 (i954).
223 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 3o6 (i-977).
224 Id.
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remedial legislation, such as voting rights laws, prior to Brown, "blacks
and other minorities would have achieved their rights by the middle of
the twentieth century. ' 225 And crucially for our purposes, "much of the
'226
emotional heat undoubtedly would have been avoided.
Chief Justice Warren drew from this experience that courts may impose limits on the political process even if they are indifferent or unconvinced that malapportionment violates the Constitution. The Court may
not even be motivated by the harm of malapportionment as such. Rather,
the Court may be concerned that malapportioned districts will lead to
discrimination against African American voters in the political process,
or that African American voters may not be able to press their claims in
legislative arenas. As a consequence, the Court might need to adjudicate
these disputes in the future, perhaps at a cost to the institution.
This lesson from the reapportionment cases is equally applicable in
the gerrymandering context. A Court unconvinced by the substantive
harms of partisan gerrymandering might nevertheless impose constitutional constraints on the practice. Without constraints, there will likely
be secondary effects of partisanship - substantive disputes that would
likely not arise except for the fact that the Court did not move to rein
in partisan gerrymandering. These secondary disputes will likely make
their way from the political process to the courts for adjudication and
resolution. Within this framework, a Court concerned with its institutional credibility and hesitant to involve itself in partisan disputes is
faced with two realistic choices. It can abstain from adjudicating the
ground rules but address the secondary substantive cases that flow out
of its refusal to set clear ground rules. Alternatively, it can set clear
ground rules, which would likely result in fewer secondary disputes in
the political process and therefore fewer cases flowing from the political
process to the courts for adjudication. These options mean that the
minimalist move - a little now to avoid more later - might be for the
Court to set ground rules in order to limit or avoid these secondary
claims. The Court should curb partisan gerrymandering to limit the
propensity of political elites to manipulate election rules for partisan
gains, thereby averting the need for the Court to adjudicate political
disputes. Judicial restraint, in other words, counsels in favor of the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims.
Our argument is framed around two crucial points. First, the posture of nonintervention underestimates its expressive and consequential
225 Id. at 3o6-07.
226 Id. at 307. Scholars have made similar claims about the Court's ability to implement broad
racial equality in Brown. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
(with Special Emphasis on Brown and Loving), 67
Court in Brown fashioned subrules to guide judges,
mentation in order to effectively implement a broad

Speech, The Warren Court and the Constitution
SMU L. REV. 671, 681 (2014) (stating that the
litigants, and other actors charged with implerule of racial equality).
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dimensions. Political gerrymandering is the most salient and perhaps
most consequential expression of the manipulation of electoral rules for
partisan gain. If the Court does not rein in partisan gerrymandering, it
will communicate to political elites not just that partisan gerrymandering is normatively acceptable, but also that partisan manipulation of
electoral rules is permissible, as long as they can get away with it.227 By
addressing the most visible manifestation of partisan-motivated manipulation, the Court can and will constrain the propensity of political actors to manipulate electoral rules for partisan gain. Intervening now
will allow the Court to play a less interventionist role down the road
because fewer or different cases will be presented for its review. Thus,
judicial supervision of partisan gerrymandering claims bears the hallmarks of judicial restraint.
Second, judicial supervision in the field of law and democracy affects
the behaviors of political elites and constrains their options. 2 28 Noninterventionists, such as Justice Frankfurter in the reapportionment cases,
have long worried that political elites will ignore judicial directives that
are inimical to the interests of those elites. But Justice Frankfurter was
wrong. Some political elites welcomed the Court's entry into the democratic process, 2 2 9 and state legislatures complied with the directive of
one person, one vote. The Court's racial gerrymandering cases are also
instructive. In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, the Court sent a message
to political elites that it would strike down districts that were excessively
gerrymandered along racial lines. Notwithstanding the political incentives, political elites responded and complied with the Court's message
and refrained from constructing explicit racial gerrymanders. This is
understandable because, as observers of the Court's political equality
cases have remarked, "the possibility of judicial review exerts a pressure
on the legislatures to behave. '230 Moreover, political elites are risk
averse. They are not likely to enact self-interested rules that they know
are likely to be struck down by the courts. If the Court communicates

227 See ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 208, at -8 ("It is vitally important that the
courts remain open to appeals in cases involving political representation, as difficult as it may be
to resolve the claims. The threat of judicial intervention hangs above the legislatures like the sword
of Damocles. Removing that threat only invites those in power to do what they can to stay there.").
228 See, e.g., id.; see also Morgan Kousser, Reapportionment Wars: Party,Race, and Redistricting
in California, 197-992,
in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 99oS 134, i86 (Bernard
Grofman ed., -998).
229 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT - A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 425 (-983) (describing President John F. Kennedy's reaction to Baker v.
Carr and his public statement that "[tihe right to fair representation and to have each vote count
equally ... is, it seems to me, basic to the successful operation of a democracy").
230 ANSOLABEHERE & SNYDER, supra note 208, at 286.
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to legislatures that it is serious about eliminating the partisan manipulation of electoral rules, political elites and legislatures will strike different bargains.
This last point makes clear the need for judicial intervention in
our partisan age, in which the impulse of political elites to use electoral
rules to acquire and secure political power is almost irresistible and selfreinforcing. Though standard democratic theory focuses us on the importance of ideas, contemporary democratic practice emphasizes the im23 1
portance of winning at almost all costs. Winning is all that matters.
This is particularly true in the context of elections. Voter turnout in our
current political environment is the pivot around which many things
turn. Political campaigns in the age of partisanship are less about persuading voters to join your side; rather, as Professor Barbara Sinclair
has persuasively demonstrated, they aim to mobilize the base - convince more of the people who are already on your side to turn out to
vote than the ones who are on the other side. 232 Importantly, anger and
233
emotion are significant to political participation.
Because elections are more about turnout than persuasion, because
voters are differentially situated on the basis of their partisan identity,
and because winning is all that matters, partisan elites have an incentive
to use election law, practice, and custom strategically for rent-seeking
purposes - to acquire political power. Any electoral rule, practice, or
custom that is outcome determinative - that will allow political elites
to acquire and maintain power - is ipso facto a candidate for manipulation. As Sinclair stated in a comprehensive analysis of political polarization in Congress, "[e]ach side really does see the other's policy and
electoral success as disastrous for the country; and this sometimes generates a feeling that anything goes, anything is justified to avert such a
catastrophe.1'234
This observation is particularly apt in the domain of election law
where the rules are directly relevant to the acquisition of political power.
Election law can be used to maximize the probability that one's partisans will turn out and minimize the probability that the other side's
partisans will turn out. Given the importance of turnout, the sophistication of methods used to identify likely partisans, and the ease with
231 See MASON, supra note 183, at 139-40 ("[T]he current alignment of social identities within
the two parties is promoting a greater focus on partisan victory than on the good of the nation.").
232 BARBARA SINCLAIR, PARTY WARS: POLARIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL

POLICY MAKING 349-50 (2006). Professor James Gardner has also noted the increased focus on
on-the-ground organizing, but characterizes elections as tabulative events, in which the purpose of
voter turnout campaigns is to ensure that the final vote accurately reflects the political preferences
of voters before the campaign. See GARDNER, supra note 175, at 102-o6.
233 MASON, supra note 183, at 86 ("[A]nger and enthusiasm are the primary emotional drivers of
political action .... ").
234 SINCLAIR, supra note 232, at 346.
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which we can predict the effects of electoral rules on turnout, the opportunity for political elites to rent-seek is ubiquitous. For example, we
know that on average, photo identification requirements are likely to
have a stronger negative impact on voter turnout within the sociodemographic groups that tend to identify with the Democratic Party than
on those who tend to identify with the Republican Party.2 35 Because
political elites know, ex ante, the likely distributional effects of electoral
rules, the insiders will attempt to manipulate electoral rules to maintain
or acquire power with minimal restraint.
As partisans press their advantage and increasingly change the electoral rules and norms to maximize partisan gain, the political-process
losers will turn to the courts for redress. They will do so whether or not
the courts provide a realistic opportunity for redress; the partisans will
view these fights as existential. Recall Sinclair's observation that each
side really does see the other side's success as disastrous for the country2 3 6 Moreover, political losers might feel especially aggrieved to the
extent that a particular outcome was achieved by changing or manipulating electoral rules. Additionally, as Professor Gillian Hadfield stated
in a slightly different though no less apt context, "people who feel as
'237
though the rules don't care about them don't care about the rules.
Thus, not only will partisans press their claims in the courts, they might
do so with greater expectation and desperation. They will expect that
courts' responses will be commensurate to the threat - to the rule of
law, to individual rights of political participation - posed by "the other
side," as they see it. Arguments about election law that were once "off
the wall," and thus not legally viable, will move "on the wall," becoming
increasingly plausible as losing parties challenge election rules in
court.238

The Court's posture of nonintervention in the age of partisanship
rests on the presumption that the Court can preserve its legitimacy and
neutrality by remaining outside the political process and avoiding the
influence of that process. That presumption is false. Federal judges

235 See Bernard L. Fraga & Michael G. Miller, Who Does Voter ID Keep from Voting? i, 5-6
(July 23, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also
id. at 28-30 (analyzing the negative effects of voter identification requirements on turnout among
minority voters in Texas).
236 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
237 GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED LAW
AND HOW To REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY 79 (2017).

238 See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/
o6/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/258040/ [https:/
perma.cc/ 3 XMN-WMPE] ("Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers think are
clearly wrong; on-the-wall arguments, by contrast, are arguments that are at least plausible, and
therefore may become law, especially if brought before judges likely to be sympathetic to them.").
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are nominated by a political process that is increasingly viewed through
the lens of partisan polarization. For example, there is growing empirical evidence of rising dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court that is
associated with partisan polarization. 239 Additionally, a pair of researchers concluded that the public sees the Court as highly politicized
and prefers Justices chosen on political and ideological grounds. 240 You
have your Justices, we have our Justices, and the goal is to have
more Justices than you do. The polarization over the Court is likely to
increase as we currently have - not surprisingly, in light of the politicization of the judicial nominating process - ideological and partisan
alignment among the Justices; the Court's conservatives were appointed
by Republican presidents and the Court's liberals were appointed by
Democratic presidents.
The perception of the Court as political is now a staple of intellectual
elites, and increasingly of legal elites as well. One need only peruse
journalistic accounts of recent Court cases to see how intellectual elites
view the Court. The titles alone tell the story. After Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Institute,24 1 the Ohio voter purge case, we saw the following
examples: "Supreme Court's Conservative Justices Uphold Ohio's Voter
Purge System ' 24 2 and "The Supreme Court's Husted Decision Will
Make It More Difficult for Democrats to Vote. '243 A brief internet
search uncovers many other examples. They are now commonplace.
The most damning piece came from Professors Lee Epstein and Eric
Posner, writing in the opinion pages of The New York Times. They
244
asked, "If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?"
They documented how the Court "has come to be rigidly divided by
both ideology and party" and wondered whether it could "sustain public
confidence for much longer. '245 The Justices are now exactly where
Justice Frankfurter did not want them to be.

239 See Eric Posner, The Supreme Court's Loss of Prestige, SLATE (Oct. 7, 2015, 5:04 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/view-from-chicago/201 5/ -o/the-supreme-court
is-losing-public-approval-and prestige.html [https:Hperma.cc/RC 3 H-QMUK].
240 See Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, PoliticalJustice? Perceptionsof Politicization and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. I05, 112 (2012).
241

138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018).

242 German Lopez, Supreme Court's Conservative Justices Uphold Ohio's Voter Purge System,
Vox (June ii, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/i 1/7448742/ohiovoter-purge-supreme-court-ruling [https:Hperma.cc/N 5 RP-83 VN].
243 Jeffrey Toobin, The Supreme Court's Husted Decision Will Make It More Difficult for
Democrats to Vote, NEW YORKER (June ii, 2oi8), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/the- supreme- courts-husted-decision- will-make-it-more-difficult- for-democrats-to- vote
[https:Hperma.cc/ 9 7 P 9 -PVNU].
244 Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Opinion, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political,Can It Be
Just?, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2oi8), https:Hnyti.s/2J8cakV [https://perma.cc/T 7 NW-GAM9].
245 Id.
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Consider in this vein the recent battles over confirmation. The sudden death of Justice Scalia led to an unexpected though ultimately inescapable change in the norms of the Senate. Then-President Obama sent
a nominee to the Senate, but Republican leaders refused to grant him
a hearing.2 46 Some Republican Senators took their opposition further
and promised to block any nominee sent to the Senate by a potential
President Hillary Clinton.2 47
The debate over the nomination of
then-Judge Kavanaugh to replace Justice Kennedy on the Court was
similarly polarized.2 48 One wonders whether Democrats will retaliate if
they re-gain control of the Senate and another Supreme Court vacancy
arises under a Republican president. Professor Richard Hasen has suggested "Democrats may have to turn to more radical measures - like
adding more justices to the court . . . - when they come back into
power in order to make up for the Merrick Garland nomination that
was blockaded by [Senator] McConnell in 2aI6.' ' 249 Two prominent
Yale law professors, Ian Ayres and John Witt, have recently argued that
Democrats should add two seats to the Court when they regain the presidency and the Senate as the party's response to the "Garland travesty. '250 The game is now afoot.
Soon after the end of the last Term, another prominent law professor,
Harvard's Mark Tushnet, wrote a brief yet scathing account of the
Court's jurisprudential turn.2 5 1 In a blog post entitled "The Standingon-One-Leg Version of Constitutional Law, Circa and Post-2018," Tushnet described the state of constitutional law as follows:
i. Statutes, policies, and practices that strengthen the Republican Party, and
those that weaken the Democratic Party, are constitutionally permissible.
2. Statutes, policies, and practices that strengthen the Democratic Party are
unconstitutional.
246

See Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama's Supreme Court Pick Unprecedented, N.Y.

TIMES (June 13, 2oi6), https:Hnyti.ms/irlDi6R [https:Hperma.cc/WB 5 D-CVJ 4].
247

David A. Graham, What Happens If Republicans Refuse to Replace Justice Scalia?, THE

ATLANTIC, (Nov. I, 2oi6), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2oi6/ii/whats-the-oppo-

site-of-court-packing/5 o6o8i/ [https://perma.cc/FY2X-CWL2].
248 See Mark Landler & Maggie Haberman, Brett Kavanaugh Is Trump's Pickfor Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2oiS), https://nyti.ms/2m8RJeG [https:Hperma.cc/ 3 NVT-E6Q 4].
249 Richard L. Hasen, The Only Thing that Might Stop Trump from Replacing Kennedy with a
Scalia Clone, SLATE (June 27, 2018, 3:40 PM), https:Hslate.com/news-and-politics/2oi8/o6/trumpwill-replace-kennedy-with-a-scalia-clone-only-one-thing-might-stop-him.html
[https:Hperma.cc/
9K 7 R-ZGNF].

250 Ian Ayres & John Fabian Witt, Opinion, Democrats Need a Plan B for the Supreme Court.
Here's One Option., WASH. POST (July 27, 2018), https://wapo.st/2mQHopA [https://perma.cc/
5 7 SF-gYFL]. Professors Ayres and Witt explain: "By connecting the proposal to the constitutional
wound of the Senate's failing to consider the nomination of Merrick Garland in 2o16, Democrats
can apply crampons to stop the partisan slide to ever more justices." Id.
251 Mark Tushnet, The Standing-on-One-Leg Version of ConstitutionalLaw, Circaand Post-20o8,
BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2018, 3:53 PM), https:Hbalkin.blogspot.com/2oi8/o6/the-standing-onone-leg-version-of.html [https:Hperma.cc/U 4 WM-H2DF].
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3.If leading Republicans are indifferent about a statute, policy, or practice,
and leading Democrats favor it, and if the statute, policy, or practice does
not strengthen the Democratic Party, the statute, policy, or practice might
or might not be constitutionally permissible.
4.If leading Republicans are indifferent and leading Democrats oppose a
statute, policy, or practice, it might be unconstitutional.
25 2
All the rest is commentary.

The Roberts Court is increasingly regarded as a Republican Court
by the journalists who report its cases 253 and by some of the legal elites
who comment on its rulings. 254 Given the flow of public opinion from
elites to the masses, 255 it won't be long before the public also forms a
view of the Roberts Court as a Republican Court; Republican voters
will find the Court congenial, but Democrats will not. The potential
harm to the Court is real and maybe even probable. The Court cannot
put its head in the sand and be agnostic about the state of American
politics. And if Justice Kagan's recent public comments are indicative,
25 6
these issues are not too far from the minds of the Justices.
Even if the Court is ambivalent about limiting political gerrymandering, it ought to do so in order to address the second-order effects of
this expression of partisanship, the manipulation of electoral rules for
partisan gain. Partisan gerrymandering is the most salient expression
of the normativity of partisanship as a justification for constructing electoral rules in order to maintain or acquire political power. Whether the
Court believes it or not, the practice of creating electoral districts simply
for the purpose of partisan advantage sends a clear message to political
elites that partisanship is justifiably the coin of the realm. There are
spillover effects for other areas of election law; the failure to hold the
line on partisan manipulation in the domain of political gerrymandering
sends a message of tacit approval of the manipulation of electoral rules

Id.
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Court UnderRoberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES
(July 24, 2oo), https:Hnyti.ms/2N 3 nrKd [https:Hperma.cc/QKV6-6 3JC] ("In its first five years, the
Roberts court issued conservative decisions 58 percent of the time. And in the term ending [in
2009], the rate rose to 65 percent, the highest number in any year since at least 1953.").
254 See, e.g., Michael J. Gerhardt, The New Religion, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 399, 416-17 (2007)
("Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist ...were all political appointees in the Justice
Department chosen at times when the only people picked as judges or justices had to have the right
kinds of credentials and ideological convictions.").
255 See Druckman et al., supra note 199, at 74.
256 Justice Kagan stated that the partisan battles over the judicial confirmation process make the
Justices look like "junior varsity politicians." Jamie Ehrlich, Kagan: Confirmation Gridlock Makes
Supreme Court Look Like "Junior Varsity Politicians," CNN (July 25, 2018, 3:5I PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2o18/ 07/25/politics/kagan-kavanaugh-junior-varsity-politicians/index.html
[https:Hperma.cc/G8 3 6-7USW]. She lamented that the confirmation of the Justices along partisan
lines "make[s] it seem that we're an extension of the political process." Id. She went on to say:
"Long-term I think that's very unhealthy for the court." Id.
252

253
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for maintaining or acquiring partisan power in other domains.2 5 7 The
failure of the Court to rein in the practice of political gerrymandering
will only encourage political elites to press their partisan advantage further.2 58 Recall here Professors Shanto Iyengar and Sean Westwood's
claim that partisan animus surpasses racial animus in both belief and
2 59
motivation because there are no norms to constrain partisan impulses.
Fundamentally, both nonintervention and judicial supervision are interventionist choices that matter for our constitutional democracy. The
question is not whether or not to intervene, but whether to intervene a
little - by shutting the door on rigging electoral rules for partisan
gain - or a lot - by adjudicating secondary claims.
CONCLUSION
Soon after the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of judicial supervision of democratic politics, some Justices immediately recognized
that "[t]he question of the gerrymander is the other half of Reynolds v.
Sims. ''260 Half a century later, the question remains. The political gerrymandering cases are the logical extension of the reapportionment revolution and the Reynolds promise of substantial equality. However compelling judicial intervention was in Baker, it is even more so now.
As we have argued here, judicial abstention cannot be justified by
the narrative of nonintervention. Limiting partisan gerrymandering is
important for its own sake. But it is also important to save the Court
from having to adjudicate second-order partisan cases that are the product of manipulation of electoral rules for the purposes of partisan gain.
The Court will increasingly be thrust in the middle of contentious
partisan disputes over electoral laws. This is no longer 1986, when
Bandemer was decided, or 2004, the year of Vieth. "Sometimes," as Ely
aptly put it, "more is less. '2 6 1 The Court has intervened successfully in
the political process before. The Court's intervention in Baker and
Reynolds is widely regarded as its finest hour, rivaled perhaps by its
intervention in Brown. It can and should intervene again. It ignores
this important role in our politics at its own peril.

257 Michael Kang has made an argument along the same lines. See Kang, supra note 28, at 41-1
12.

258 The similarities to the reapportionment revolution are unmistakable.

See ALEXANDER

KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE

("It was unrealistic to expect that an undemocratic distribution of
power could be reformed democratically. Consequently, if the judiciary did not act, if it failed to
establish a yardstick for assessing the democratic content of electoral structures, the door would be
open to a wide range of abuses.").
259 See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
260 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 176 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in the result in part) (footnote omitted).
UNITED STATES 287 (2000)

261 ELY, supra note 164, at 125.
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